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Keynes, Chicago and Friedman 
 
Chapter 13: The Debate Widens 
 
Robert Leeson 
 
3 June 2002 
 
Shortly after Don Patinkin’s initial assault on Milton Friedman, Thomas Humphrey 
(chapter 14 [1971], 12) highlighted the importance of the contributions (“overlooked by 
both Patinkin and Friedman”) made to the quantity theory between 1930-50 by four non-
Chicagoan economists: Carl Synder,i Lionel Edie,ii Lauchlin Currie and Clark Warburton.  
There are similarities between Friedman’s version of the Chicago monetary tradition and 
Currie’s Supply and Control of Money in the United States (1934).  Also, Currie’s (1962 
[1934]) essay on ‘The Failure of Monetary Policy to Prevent the Depression of 1929-32’ 
interpreted the Great Depression as a Great Contraction in a manner which foreshadowed 
the later work by Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963).  Humphrey commented that 
“oddly enough, however, [Lloyd] Mints and Friedman do not seem to be aware of the 
extent to which their criticisms were anticipated by Currie, for they cite him 
infrequently”.  In the exchange that followed two further names were added to the list of 
overlooked quantity theorists: Arthur Margetiii and James Angell (Patinkin chapter 16 
[1974], 28; Humphrey chapter 17 [1973], 462).iv  Both Patinkin and Humphrey expressed 
curiosity about these omissions.  Currie (chapter 15 [1972]) provides an additional 
perspective on Humphrey’s contribution in a note that is published here for the first time.       
 
It seems unlikely that Friedman was unaware of Currie’s April 1934 Journal of Political 
Economy (JPE) essay since it was reprinted, at Harry Johnson’s insistence, in 1962 as 
one of the JPE Landmarks in Political Economy; the selection criteria of which included 
“impact upon professional economists”.v  The editor of that volume noted that the load 
“borne by … Milton Friedman” in the production of that volume had been 
“disproportionately heavy” (Hamilton 1962, ix-x).  There are several references to 
Warburton’s “important papers” in the Friedman and Schwartz (1963, 301, n2, 359, n71) 
Monetary History, but Currie’s name is not listed in their bibliography.  Indeed, Currie 
(correspondence 29 November 1972) informed Patinkin that he had been informed by 
Harry Johnson that Friedman had “nothing to do with the selection of my paper in the 
Landmarks of Political Economy”.vi     
 
This introductory chapter contrasts Friedman’s endorsement of Warburton as a pioneer 
monetarist and his initial reluctance to mention Currie and Angell in this context.  It also 
examines some previously unpublished archival evidence highlighting the intensity of 
some of the passions engendered by this debate.   
 
15.1 Warburton 
Without specifically referring to his own work, Warburton (1963, 77) noted that the 
conclusions derived by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) “should come as no surprise to 
anyone who has surveyed the history of business-fluctuation theory”.  The “most 
continuous” component of the existing literature was to attribute “a dominant causal” role 
to “misbehavior of the monetary and banking system”.  Warburton (1952, 292-3) 
reported that “the most remarkable theory feature of contemporary business-fluctuation 
theory is the unanimity with which economists have ignored the timing and amplitude of 
changes in the quantity of money in the United States relative to changes in population, 
output, consumer spending, prices and employment”.  The first three ‘villains’ in 
Warburton’s list were John Maynard Keynes, Alvin Hansen and Frank Knight.  Mints 
and Henry Simons apparently approved of Warburton’s work.  Mints recalled that 
(presumably in the 1930s) “I remember distinctly (I think!) that after a talk by Warburton 
at the University [of Chicago] both Simons and I were greatly pleased by what 
Warburton had said.  I even gained the impression that Warburton was grateful for our 
approval” (cited by Patinkin chapter 46 [1981/1979], 284-5).   
 
Warburton was a monetarist while Friedman was still a wartime Keynesian.vii  Friedman 
and Warburton contributed to the same wartime debate on the Inflationary Gap in the 
American Economic Review (AER).  Friedman criticized Walter Salant’s (1941) essay on 
‘The Inflationary Gap: Meaning and Significance for Policy Making’.  But when his AER 
critique was reprinted, Friedman (1953, 253, n2, 251, n) was obliged to add a footnote: 
“The next seven paragraphs and the subsequent material inclosed in brackets are 
additions to the article as originally published.  As I trust the new material makes clear, 
the omission from that version of monetary effects is a serious error which is not excused 
but may perhaps be explained by the prevailing temper of the times”.  This was “a serious 
error of omission”.   
 
Warburton continued the debate with ‘Measuring the Inflationary Gap’ (1943) and 
‘Monetary Expansion and the Inflationary Gap’ (1944).  Warburton (1944, 303, 318, 323, 
325-6) argued that the first ‘gap’ that required filling was “the gap between those 
economists who approach the problem of price inflation from analysis of the use of 
income and those who approach it from monetary theory and the analysis of monetary 
statistics … Monetary theory has also long had an answer to the next question in the 
exploration of the causes of price fluctuations: How much pressure on prices is exerted 
by monetary expansion or monetary contraction? … This commonsense view is an 
application to money of the general economic principle known as the law of supply and 
demand.  The refinement of this view which has long been made by monetary theory is 
often spoken of as the quantity theory of money”.  Warburton believed that his statistical 
analysis demonstrated that “These facts are in perfect accord with the quantity theory of 
money, defined as the belief that changes in the price level are primarily due to changes 
in the volume of money relative to the need for money … Modern economists who 
observe the facts around them have no … reason to disavow this old-fashioned theory”.  
For Warburton the “cause of the great depression of the early 1930s was monetary 
deficiency” and “the greater part of the amplitude of business fluctuations could be 
eliminated by … monetary policy”.           
 
Although Warburton was not a full member of the Chicago School, several of his articles 
appeared in Chicago journals.viii  The JPE published Warburton’s ‘The Trend of Savings’ 
(1935), ‘The Volume of Money and the Price Level Between the World Wars’ (1945), 
‘Quantity and Frequency of Use of Money in the United States, 1919-45’ (1946), 
‘Volume of Savings, Quantity of Money and Business Instability’ (1947) and ‘Money 
and Business Fluctuations in the Schumpeterian System’ (1953).  Also, the Journal of 
Business of the University of Chicago published Warburton’s ‘Monetary Policy and 
Business Forecasting’ (1949) and his ‘Misplaced Emphasis in Contemporary Business-
Fluctuation Theory’ (1952 [1946]).  This later essay – “his best known and most 
important contribution” - was reprinted in the AEA Readings in Monetary Theory co-
edited by Mints (Lutz and Mints 1952).  According to Michael Bordo and Anna Schwartz 
(1987 [1979], 236-7) this essay provided evidence that Warburton “anticipated the 
Keynesian-monetarist debate of the 1960s by a decade or more”.  Warburton’s (1952 
[1946], 284, 317) purpose was to point out that “a far more potent force of economic 
instability in recent years, namely, erratic variations in the quantity of money, has been 
ignored” in Keynesian analysis.  There would be no progress in business cycle theory 
without the “elimination of its misplaced emphasis on savings-investment relationships 
and a re-examination of the significance of changes in the money supply”.         
  
Warburton (6 January 1968) wrote to Friedman to congratulate him on his AEA 
Presidential Address: “it was a very well-developed exposition of the view both of us 
[emphasis added] have reached from our studies of the factual record and the reasoning 
and hypotheses of our predecessors.  I still find it amazing that the factual data available 
and the views of earlier economists on the role of money were so largely ignored during 
the ‘Keynesian revolution’ … your eloquent statement of our case [emphasis added] 
before today’s professional audience, young and old, will bear fruits I am sure”.ix  
Friedman (20 January 1966) informed Charles Golembe of the American Bankers 
Association that Warburton “is now, we are all glad to say, no longer so lonely in his 
intellectual companionship”.x 
 
From 1934 until his retirement in 1965, Warburton (1981, 293) was employed at the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Commission (FDIC) which was not, he recalled, an “academic 
center” (it was established in 1933 to prevent another collapse of the banking system).xi  
In July 1951, Friedman wrote to Warburton urging him to write a “substantial 
monograph” so as to maximise the impact of his work.  Warburton thought it was unwise 
for him to do so.  Warburton (6 January 1968) recalled to Friedman that in 1955 John 
Black, the AEA president had invited him to participate in an AEA panel discussion on 
‘The Monetary Role in Balanced Economic Growth’.  Since 1953, Warburton had “been 
prohibited by FDIC from publishing articles or participating in public discussions on 
monetary problems or policies”.  His employers led him to believe that his “job would be 
at stake” if he accepted Black’s invitation: “With real regret, I declined, deciding to play 
by the rules of the ‘game’ in which I was involved, but hoping to extract myself or that a 
new breeze would blow soon in Washington.  The ban was in effect for several years” 
(see also Yeager 1981, 280; Cargill 1979, 445; Bordo and Schwartz 1987 [1979], 235; 
Steindl 1995, 160, n5, 159, n1).xii     
 
15.2 Currie 
Unlike Warburton, Friedman did not initially embrace Currie as an intellectual 
predecessor.xiii  In his study of the causes of the Depression, Hans Neisser (1936, 116, 
n14) interpreted Currie and Ralph Hawtrey as having placed the “responsibility entirely 
upon the credit policy of the Federal Reserve System”.xiv  In the 1930s, Currie’s work 
was well known to Chicago economists (Laidler chapter 33 [1993], 1089; Samuelson 
1996, 150; Bach 1940, 76, n1; Reeve 1943).  Jacob Viner befriended Currie whilst visiting 
Harvard in November 1932.xv  At Harvard in 1933, Erik Lundberg (1994 [1934], 62) 
learnt that the depression had been caused by “a lack of money rather than an abundance 
… It was certainly stimulating though a sad bankruptcy in economic theory, to now learn 
the exact opposite of what I had learnt before … Professor Currie was the most eager 
advocate of this theory”.xvi   
 
When Viner was asked by Henry Morgenthau, President Roosevelt’s Treasury Secretary 
to assemble a ‘monetary Brain Trust’, among his early recruits were Currie and Harry 
Dexter White (Sandilands 1990, 56-7; Rees 1973, 40; Laidler and Sandilands chapter 41 
[2002]).  The 1935 banking bill was described by James Warburg (1969, 2944) as 
“Curried Keynes”.xvii  When Herbert Stein (1995, 216) arrived in Washington in 1938 he 
regarded Currie as “the most important economist in Washington”.  In the 1930s, Currie 
attempted to recruit both Friedman and Arthur F. Burns to the Federal Reserve (Currie 
1978, 547; Steindl 1995, 73, n14; correspondence from Friedman 13 September 2000).   
 
In his The Quantity Theory of Money: A Critical Study of its Historical Development and 
Interpretation and a Restatement, Hugo Hegeland (1969 [1951], 3) observed that “the 
interpretations of the quantity theory shows almost as many variations as the number of 
its adherents”.xviii  But Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 15-7) expropriated the quantity theory 
for monetarist purposes: “the question arises what it means to say someone is or is not a 
‘quantity theorist’”.  Friedman then went on to delineate the set of “deep and 
fundamental” demarcation rules which had to be accepted before one could be treated as 
a member of the quantity theorist ‘crusade’.xix In particular, Friedman asserted that the 
quantity theorist “accepts the empirical hypothesis that the demand for money is highly 
stable – more stable than functions such as the consumption function that are offered as 
alternative key relations”.          
 
Roger Sandilands (1990, 38, 96, 55-6, 156-7) speculated that underpinning Friedman’s 
neglect of Currie might have been the view that “one cannot be a bona fide monetarist if 
one is also a New Dealer”.  Currie recalled that “in the early days, the New Deal was in 
the nature of a crusade” (see also Green 1981, 231-2).  Currie became the victim of 
another crusade.  In testimony to the 1948 House Committee on Un-American Activities, 
the self-confessed Soviet agent, Elizabeth Bentley, stated that in 1935 she “met 
Communists, both in Columbia and downtown, and gradually my ideas began to change”.  
Although she had never met him, she named Currie as someone who had passed 
information to a wartime spy ring that reported to her during Currie’s tenure as adviser to 
President Roosevelt (Carr 1952, 90-1, 241).  In 1948, Currie and his old Harvard friend 
Harry Dexter White were obliged to appear before the House Committee on Un-
American Activities to defend themselves against her allegations (White died of a heart 
attack immediately after these proceedings).  No charges were ever brought against 
Currie, and in 1949 he was chosen to head a World Bank mission to Colombia and later 
to help administer President Harry Truman’s “Point Four” development programme there 
(Sandilands, 1990, 156). During the McCarthy era, however, an unjustified cloud of 
suspicion hung heavy over Currie and he chose to settle permanently in Colombia where 
he developed a highly successful career as a top-level presidential adviser and 
development economist, noted for his sustained work on monetary theory and policy that 
paralleled his 1930s work in the United States.   
 
The Chicago Tribune was a primary vehicle for the dissemination of these jaundiced 
opinions about Currie.  Friedman (1983, 178) calculated that by 1934 “close to a 
majority” of faculty and students within the social sciences at the University of Chicago 
were “either members of the Communist party or very close to it”.  The Chicago Tribune 
fanned anti-communist flames and the Illinois State Senate established a committee to 
investigate subversive influences in the educational system (Schlesinger 1960, 604, 607, 
529, 88, 94; Stigler 1988, 157; Ickes 1953, 368, 376).xx  In February 1950, Senator 
Joseph McCarthy’s “first important blow” against supposed communists in the State 
Department was reported the following day in only two newspapers, one of which was 
the Chicago Tribune (Buckley and Bozell 1954, 160, n, 50-1).  Later, McCarthy received 
financial backing from Colonel Robert McCormick, the publisher of the Chicago Tribune 
(Revere 1959, 115).   
 
The Chicago Tribune produced what Herbert Simon (1991, 121) regarded as a “thick 
stream of bile” in its battle to save what it regarded as the American way of life against 
the New Deal.  According to Rexford Tugwell (1972, 169), the Chicago Tribune 
continued to print stories that were “straight Hoover.  It might have been culled from the 
Memoirs”.  In 1961, the Chicago Tribune described Currie as a Soviet spy “who is 
planning how the dollars provided by a country which has stripped him of citizenship are 
to be employed in Colombia.  It will be surprising if President Kennedy doesn’t find out 
he has made an alliance for Communist progress in that country” (cited by Stormer 1964, 
72).xxi  In reality, Currie was not involved in Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.  Indeed, in 
1961, he traveled to Washington to enlist the support of White House adviser Walt 
Rostow for an alternative national urbanization programme for Colombia (Sandilands, 
1990, 157).xxii 
 
In the introduction to the second edition of Currie’s Supply and Control of Money in the 
United States, Karl Brunner (1968) highlighted the many unacknowledged similarities 
between Currie’s work in the 1930s and subsequent monetary analysis.  In 1966, as 
Brunner was preparing the reprint, Friedman informed him that “Currie is a fugitive from 
justice somewhere in South America” (cited by Sandilands 1990, 157; correspondence 
from Sandilands 15 March 2002).  Citing Currie’s (1934) book, Anna Schwartz (1981, 6) 
explained that she and Friedman “did, of course, have at hand” a variety of measures of 
monetary variables for the period of the Great Depression.  But Friedman did not initially 
acknowledge Currie’s contribution.  Currie (29 November 1972) wrote to Patinkin: “I 
know that both Karl Brunner and Lowell Harriss wrote to Friedman over his lack of 
mention of my work in his book but I never heard that he replied.  I suspect that he 
disapproves of me strongly”.xxiii  But Friedman made reparations: Currie (14 November 
1979) wrote to Albert Lepawsky explaining that in the 1970s Friedman sent him a copy 
of Monetary Statistics of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz 1970) inscribed ‘to a 
pioneer in the field’.xxiv  In addition, he has now issued a specific “mea culpa” (Laidler 
chapter 33 [1993], 1077, n12).  
 
15.3 Angell 
In launching the monetarist counter-revolution, Friedman characterised Chicago as the 
early intellectual home of the modern quantity theory.  He spent his second graduate year 
(1933-4) at Columbia: “the early intellectual home of the New Deal” (Adolf Berle cited 
by Schlesinger 1960, 393).  At Columbia, Friedman was taught by Angell, who served on 
the front line of Roosevelt’s brains trust as a monetary expert and speechwriter (Moley 
1939, 15, 18, 22; Berle 1973, 51, 32, 45, 50-1).xxv  Angell was one of the Men Around the 
President (Alsop and Kintner 1939, 21).  
 
The policy conclusions in Angell’s The Behaviour of Money: Exploratory Studies (1936) 
appear to have a monetarist ring about them (Lee and Wellington 1984; Milgate and Levy 
1987; Steindl 1995).  Angell (1936, 144-5, 161-4, 61, 159) sought to provide the 
groundwork to “test” the relevant parts of existing theories.  He concluded that the 
circular velocity had been very stable between 1909-30, but had fallen after 1930.  Thus 
the large increase in national income prior to 1930 “must have been chiefly associated 
with increases in the money stock”.  Although Angell doubted that there was a close 
relation between the quantity of deposits and the level of prices, he opposed the counter-
cyclical manipulation of the money supply.  He concluded that “the most effective 
procedure is to stabilise the quantity of money itself” allowing it to change “only 
gradually and evenly”.  Although he was wary of dogmatic conclusions about causality, 
he suggested that an increase in business activity would cause “a subsequent expansion of 
(particularly) deposits, which our type of banking system permits and usually encourages, 
will in turn support or even induce a further increase in business activity.  A rising spiral 
of mutually aggravating actions and reactions may thus be set up, which may persist for a 
considerable time”.xxvi  
 
Angell (1933a, 225, 207) used the quantity theory to advance the proposition that the 
principal cause of unemployment was “excessive variations in the volume of bank 
credit”.  Angell also prefaced his analysis with a statement about his preference for 
“planned economies … With these proposals I have great sympathy, and I think the 
adoption of almost any one of them would be an improvement over our present forms of 
business organisation”.  Angell (1933b, 56, 70) also explained that “a solution through 
explicit socialisation or collectivisation may be debarred here by hypothesis” because 
“intelligent systems of planning” were too far in advance of American opinion: “In a 
society where laws and the prevailing social and economic philosophy make deliberate 
control easier than it is now in the United States, this type of planning and the monetary 
measures outlined above would presumably go hand-in-hand”. 
 
In his Memoirs, Friedman recalled that he thought that he had attended Angell’s course 
on international economics, which he found to be “most valuable” (Friedman and 
Friedman 1998, 44, 46).xxvii  In a letter to Patinkin (19 July 1972) Friedman explained 
that the reason he had subsequently paid “little or no attention” to Angell was “very 
simple: his theoretical work in my opinion was very pedestrian and superficial.  Let me 
say that I was a graduate student Colombia in the year 1933-34 and took Angell’s course.  
I started to dictate that I took his course in monetary analysis, but I’m not sure whether it 
was that which I took or his course in international theory which he also gave.  In any 
event I recall very well that I was unenthusiastic to put it mildly – contemptuous would 
be a better word – at the theoretical level of the analysis.  The same thing goes for 
Angell’s [1936] book.  I believe the theoretical analysis in it adds very little to our 
understanding.  It is a highly mechanical approach.  On the other hand Angell was 
responsible for a good deal of empirical work.  He was very much a pioneer in that 
area”.xxviii     
 
Friedman’s first recollection was more accurate than his second: in spring semester 1934 
he attended Angell’s “Economics 128 Currency and Credit”.xxix  Thirty of Friedman’s 
forty-six pages of lecture notes from Angell’s course relate to Keynes’ Treatise.  This 
section of the course began with “Keynes: ‘Treatise on Money’ great ‘tour de force’ says 
Angell”.  Friedman may well have been “contemptuous” because he had already been 
thoroughly exposed to the Treatise in Chicago the previous year in Mints’ Economics 
330 (see chapter 54 below).  Perhaps there were other factors, too.  George Tavlas 
(chapter 34 [1997], 173) recounts the information (provided to him by Peter Kenen and 
Benjamin Cohen) that by the 1950s, Angell devoted much of his teaching to defending 
the General Theory against the Keynesian Neoclassical Synthesis. xxx     
     
15.3 Stigler 
In addition to the Patinkin-Humphrey exchange there were eight other occasions in which 
pairs of economists debated the validity of Friedman’s claim.  The original pair were 
Friedman (chapter 2 [1956]) and Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981]).  A second bout was 
arranged between Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974]) and Patinkin (chapter 6 
[1972/1974]) in a JPE symposium.  In the third and fourth bouts George Tavlas engaged 
J. Ronnie Davis and Tom Cate in the Southern Economic Journal (chapter 27 [1979]; 
chapter 26 [1979]; chapter 29 [1981]; chapter 28 [1981]).  The fifth bout occurred in the 
JMCB in February 1986 between Michael Parkin (chapter 18 [1986]) and Patinkin 
(chapter 19 [1986]).    
 
The Parkin-Patinkin exchange illustrates some of the cross cutting cleavages generated 
by the dispute over the Chicago tradition.  Parkin and David Laidler are fellow 
monetarists who estimated the ‘Demand for Money in the United Kingdom, 1956-1967’ 
(Laidler and Parkin 1970).  Their establishment of the Manchester University Inflation 
Workshop in July 1971 contributed to the monetarist explanation of inflation (Congdon 
1978, 20).  They joined the University of Western Ontario, where Patinkin held a visiting 
appointment and where Johnson was a regular visitor.  Simultaneously, Parkin (1986) 
implicitly used the Chicago “sticky price” oral tradition located by Patinkin and Stanley 
Fischer (chapter 5 [1969/1981]) to analyse the output-inflation trade-off.  This type of 
research became an important component of the New Keynesian response to the New 
Classical third generation Chicago School version of Simons’ “rules party” (Fischer 
1977; Taylor 1979; Mankiw 1985; Akerlof and Yellen 1985).   
 
Parkin (chapter 18 [1986], 106-7) interpreted Patinkin (chapter 44 [1974], 4) as having 
defined Keynesian monetary theory as being primarily concerned with “details 
concerning the demand for money function … a direct outgrowth of the Treatise”.  
Parkin noted that between 1917-30, A.C. Pigou, R.G. Hawtrey, Edward Cannan, Lionel 
Edie and Cyril James all appeared to recognize that the quantity theory could be 
formulated in terms of the demand for money and that “such a formulation was explicitly 
a portfolio analysis – an analysis of substitution between money and goods”.  Moreover, 
Simons, Mints and Knight appeared also to be in this tradition.  Thus “Friedman’s 
identification of the quantity theory as being first and foremost a theory of the demand 
for money is entirely in line with the writings of all the major quantity theorists of the 
1930s”.        
 
Parkin examined Patinkin’s method of historical research and found that he has fallen 
into the “dangerous pitfall” which he cautioned others about: that of “reading things out 
of context”.  In particular, Patinkin “misquoted and misunderstood” Friedman’s 
reasoning.  In reply, Patinkin (chapter 19 [1986]) argued that Parkin had not 
distinguished between a writer’s “basic analytical framework” and occasional references 
to other frameworks: “Parkin is repeatedly guilty of the basic methodological fallacy of 
reading meaning into texts”.  Moreover, Parkin had not, as purported, written a review of 
Essays On and In the Chicago Tradition, but instead after seventeen years provided a 
“belated criticism” of “my 1969 article” (chapter 5 [1981/1969]).xxxi     
 
Following Patinkin and Parkin, the next combatants were Laidler (chapter 33 [1993]) and 
George Tavlas (chapter 34 1997]) in the JPE.  Following the commonly accepted rules of 
scholarly engagement, the editors of the JPE offered Laidler a brief right of reply.  This 
constraint (a two page rejoinder) was, however, ill suited to the nature of the evidence in 
dispute and so a seventh bout was arranged in the Journal of Economic Studies (Laidler 
chapters 36 and 38 [1998]; Tavlas chapter 37 [1998]).xxxii  This was followed by a further 
exchange of letters in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (chapters 39 and 40 [1999]).  
Patinkin was Friedman’s major critic; now Tavlas emerged to defend Friedman’s 
assertion.xxxiii  It seems unlikely that Laidler’s further contribution with Sandilands 
(chapters 41 [2002] and 42 [1932]) will pass without a rejoinder.          
 
Yet there is an exception to this sequence of seven pairs: when the JPE published Frank 
Steindl’s (chapter 21 [1990]) essay on ‘The “Oral Tradition” at Chicago in the 1930s’ 
without Patinkin’s brief rejoinder, which is published here for the first time (chapter 22 
[1991]).  Stigler was the JPE editor dealing with both Steindl’s essay and Patinkin’s 
rejoinder.  The archival evidence cast some light on the passions engendered by the 
dispute over the authentic Chicago lineage.xxxiv   
 
Steindl (chapter 21 [1990], 430-1) briefly summarised Patinkin’s accusations and then 
posed the question: “Was there an oral tradition of the quantity theory at Chicago or not?  
One important piece of evidence in support of such a tradition is Henry Simons’ 
enthusiastic review (chapter 20 [1935]) of Lauchlin Currie’s Supply and Control of 
Money in the United States (1934)”.  Steindl continued: “the quantity theory is an 
essential component of Currie’s analysis ... The existence of a Chicago oral tradition can 
be seen in Simons’ four page review, which begins ‘This book should have a significant 
and salutary effect, both on professional opinion and on college teaching.  It ... expounds 
clearly a set of views which, while firmly established in the ‘oral tradition’ of some 
schools [leaving little doubt that Chicago is one of them], are [sic] meagerly represented 
in the accessible literature’”.  
 
The plurality of the “schools” mentioned by Simons suggests a lack of uniqueness.xxxv  
Indeed, Currie (1934, ix) explained that “most of the subject matter” of his book had 
“been taught [by Currie] in the first half of the money and banking courses at Harvard for 
some years”.  Nevertheless, Steindl’s evidence was relevant to the debate and deserved to 
be published.  Tavlas (chapter 35 [1998], 215) regarded it as a significant, possibly even a 
clinching contribution.  Patinkin’s (chapter 22 [1991]) response was that Steindl’s 
evidence failed to support Friedman’s propositions about the specific contents of the oral 
tradition.   
 
According to Patinkin (chapter 5 [1969/1981], 249) the dispute over the oral tradition did 
not revolve around fallible memories since he, unlike his rival, had the “concrete 
evidence” of lecture notes.  Patinkin also took his stand not only on the basis of his 
superior mastery of the relevant historical literature.  Patinkin (chapter 16 [1973/1981], 
283) referred to Simons’ 1935 review of Currie’s Supply and Control of Money in the 
United States; he left no doubt that he was claiming to have exhaustively searched the 
Simons literature.  But Steindl appeared to have resolved the Patinkin-Friedman dispute 
in favour of Friedman, using evidence that Patinkin must have been aware of.  This must 
have been especially stinging for Patinkin (chapter 6 [1972/1974], 112) given that his 
accusation against Friedman was that he had “ignored the detailed evidence which has 
been adduced against the views he expresses” and had “indulged in casual empiricism in 
the attempt to support his doctrinal interpretations”.  Friedman (chapter 7 [1972/1974], 
177) believed he had refuted Patinkin’s claims, and in return accused him of “careless 
textual interpretation”.  
 
Stigler had a “mordant” sense of humour (McCann and Perlman 1993, 994, 1012); and 
Patinkin believed that Stigler was attempting to ensure that Friedman got the last laugh 
with respect to the Chicago monetary tradition.  Patinkin (to Stigler, 31 January 1990) 
was cross with Stigler for not reviewing Thomas K. Rymes’ (1988) Keynes's Lectures, 
1932-35: Notes of a Representative Student; but he was livid when the JPE published 
Steindl’s note.  In his reply, Patinkin (chapter 22 [1991]) stated that Steindl’s note 
completely misrepresented the debate.  He had never denied the existence of a Chicago 
monetary oral tradition; it was Friedman’s interpretation of that tradition that was the 
subject at issue.xxxvi  In correspondence, Patinkin (18 June 1991) reminded Stigler of 
sentiments that he (Patinkin) had expressed in an earlier letter, about the “fallacious 
nature” and the “demonstrably false statements” contained in Steindl’s essay.  Stigler had 
replied to Patinkin, apparently sympathetically, bemoaning the “shocking ... lack of care 
of people in reading and reporting on the literature”.xxxvii  It seems likely that Patinkin 
interpreted Stigler’s letter as an indication that his rejoinder to Steindl would be 
sympathetically considered.  But Stigler, who apparently accepted Steindl’s note without 
subjecting it to the usual refereeing process, unceremoniously rejected Patinkin’s reply.  
 Friedman (correspondence to the author, 19 September 1997) recalls that he “was very 
appreciative of Steindl’s piece”.  Patinkin was certainly not and was outraged by Stigler’s 
behaviour.  He insisted that Stigler reconsider the matter with his three co-editors.  But 
Stigler (6 August 1991) replied that he and his fellow JPE editors regarded Patinkin’s 
rejoinder as “simply too unimportant to be published”.xxxviii   
 
The Patinkin-Stigler relationship was different from the Patinkin-Friedman relationship.  
In particular, Stigler, unlike Friedman, was an historian of economic thought.  In this 
context Stigler (3 July 1972) advised Patinkin that in his research on Chicago monetary 
history he was “as mistaken as you can be”.  Stigler appeared to be pulling rank in his 
efforts to discourage Patinkin: “As a historian of economics I have come more and more 
to view science as a social institution and process, not as intellectual acrobatics by 
individual good and bad guys.  I commend that viewpoint to you”.xxxix   
 
Patinkin spent autumn 1972 at Chicago where he pursued his interest in what he regarded 
as the authentic Chicago tradition.xl  He could have used the opportunity to launch a 
parallel attack on Stigler’s version of the Chicago tradition.  “The Chicago School of Anti-
Monopolistic Competition” was first explicitly defined and described by Edward 
Chamberlin (1957, 296).  According to Stigler (1988, 150), only then did economists begin 
to refer to Chicago as a “School”.xli  Chamberlin (1957, 13-5, 17, 26, 300, 305, 24, 43, 70-
91, 226-249, 305-6) sought to direct microeconomists Towards a More General Theory of 
Value.  He felt himself to be confronted by the “right wing orthodoxy” of the Chicago 
School who “cling desperately to perfect competition” and could offer only a “jumble of 
reasons ... a cloud of dust” to defend the status quo: “mere tricks to bolster up what is at 
bottom an emotional position ... surely better sticks than this could be found ... people who 
live in ad hoc houses should be more indulgent”.  Chamberlin sought to overcome this 
“heavy” legacy by reformulating his theory to assist the process of measurement.  He 
concluded that his hypothesis had come into existence following the ‘classical’ scientific 
process outlined in Friedman’s (1953) ‘Methodology of Positive Economics’.  
  
With respect to this second generation Chicago School methodology, Patinkin accused 
Friedman and Stigler of inconsistency, if not hypocrisy.  In particular, Stigler’s approach 
to empirical work “sent shudders” through him (cited by Leeson [1998] chapter 11).  In 
1963, Friedman and Stigler stood accused on identical grounds by refusing to debate the 
empirical merits of the theory of monopolistic competition.  Patinkin apparently took a 
keen interest in this exchange between Christopher Archibald (1961; 1963) and Friedman 
(1963) and Stigler (1963).  Stigler (1963, 63) ridiculed Archibald’s discussion of Chicago 
as a “detour ... The methodological discussion is a detour on the detour”.  In ‘Reply to 
Chicago’ Archibald (1963, 69) repeated his complaint about the methodological 
“inconsistency in Friedman's and Stigler's dismissal of monopolistic competition on 
apparently a priori grounds”.  They were, he stated, guilty of “a shocking piece of 
obscurantism, and an indefensible attempt to close discussion”.xlii   
 
Patinkin and Stigler presented differing assessments about the extent to which 
monopolistic competition had been discussed in Chicago.  Citing this exchange between 
Chicago and its critics, and using his 1942 Economics 301 class notes, Patinkin (1981 
[1973], 31) concluded that Knight had discussed monopolistic competition and had 
referred his students to the relevant readings “to an extent greater than one might infer 
from some of the things that have been written on the attitude of the Chicago school to 
this theory”.xliii  This contradicted Stigler’s view, which was that Knight (his PhD 
supervisor) “devoted even less time than compliments to Chamberlin so students had to 
read the book on their own” (Stigler and Friedland 1975, 497, n23).xliv  But for whatever 
reason, this skirmish with Stigler did not escalate as had his private skirmish with 
Friedman.  
 
Both Patinkin and Stigler were stern ‘gate-keepers’ of their respective disciplines.  With 
respect to the Keynesian literature, Patinkin had a well-deserved reputation for rejecting 
an astonishingly high proportion of essays that he was asked to referee.  Between 1976-
95, Patinkin wrote 69 referees reports for the History of Political Economy; 56 he 
rejected outright, 3 he accepted outright (Saunders 2001).xlv  Referring to “committee 
meetings and journal editing”, Stigler (1969, 229) argued that it was both “true, and 
necessary to their survival” that “learned bodies are each run by a self perpetuating inner 
clique”.  Citing The Devil’s Dictionary, Stigler defined an incumbent as “A person of the 
liveliest interest to the outcumbents”.  Referring to the dispute over the oral tradition, 
Stigler (1988, 153-4) pointed out that Friedman used the quantity theory “as a powerful 
weapon to attack the Keynesian theory” and was “quite talented in outraging his 
intellectual opponents”.  Stigler outraged Patinkin by refusing to publish his rejoinder to 
Steindl.    
 
On another occasion Stigler (2 April 1979) had advised Patinkin: “Why be so polite?”xlvi  
Certainly, Stigler could not be accused of handling Patinkin with excessive tact over his 
rejoinder to Steindl.  In a letter to all four editors, Patinkin maintained his rage about 
Steindl’s “egregious misinterpretation of this disagreement”.  It was, he explained, 
troubling to see the JPE “with which for obvious reasons I feel a close connection - fail 
to fulfill its obligations as a scholarly journal”.  Patinkin’s letter was dated 19 September 
1991, but Stigler’s death (1 December 1991) did not diminish his anger.  Samuelson (12 
February 1992) tried to console him with similar stories about Stigler’s behaviour.  To 
which Patinkin (6 March 1992) replied that “In my case, it was even worse ...”.xlvii   
 
Patinkin proceeded to question Stigler’s credentials as an historian.xlviii  He informed 
Laidler (correspondence 9 October 1994) that Friedman’s attempt to defend himself 
against the criticisms contained in the original JMCB essay “by expounding at length on 
the Chicago advocacy in the 1930s of an activist monetary and [sic] policy” was 
irrelevant because the point was “never in question”.  Patinkin continued: “Unfortunately 
– for we would expect that a leading historian of thought would base his views on a 
careful reading of texts – Stigler in his autobiography attempts to defend Friedman with 
the same irrelevant argument”.xlix  
 
However, despite the relatively high heat-to-light ratio, the debate over the Chicago 
tradition revealed a vibrant sub-culture in the economics profession.  Patinkin, Johnson 
(and Stigler) were pre-eminent theorists, fully aware of the important role that history can 
play in the analysis of contemporary issues (Laidler 2002).l  The formalist revolution has 
tended to leech this “dynamic framework” out of economic analysis (Leeson 2001).  A 
quarter of a century ago, Lionel Robbins (1976, 39) himself a pre-eminent theorist, 
denigrated “the extraordinary provincialism in time of much contemporary professional 
literature” – a trend which has continued.  As a result many contemporary theorists 
(many of whom are historically untrained) typically deny their students an opportunity to 
acquire historical erudition by denigrating the subject and by deleting history of thought 
courses (Rosen 1993, 811).li  History continues to be used by theorists as a potent 
rhetorical weapon – a rhetorical flourish sustained by an intellectual monopoly (Laidler 
2002).  Moreover, the formalist revolution has begun to devour its own children: as the 
demand to study economics falls, so the supply of academic positions dries up.  
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NOTES 
 
i  Frank Knight would not have appreciated Carl Snyder’s (1927) Business cycles and 
business measurements: studies in quantitative economics, with its emphasis on empirical 
economics and its frontispiece quotation from Lord Kelvin extolling the empirical 
approach.  When in 1929 the University of Chicago Social Science Research Building 
was dedicated, the Committee of Symbolism choose as the building’s inscription another 
quotation supposedly from Kelvin: “When you cannot measure your knowledge is 
meagre and unsatisfactory” (Cate 1956, 426-7).  In his JPE analysis of ‘Truth in 
Economics’ Knight (1940, 18, n10, 30, n17) stated that Kelvin’s dictum was a perversion 
of the social sciences: “misleading and pernicious … In this field, the Kelvin dictum very 
largely means in practice ‘if you cannot measure, measure anyhow!’ … To call averaging 
estimates, or guesses, measurement seems to merely embezzling a word for its prestige 
value”.  In contrast, Paul Douglas (1930, 4) used Kelvin’s dictum to “remind … 
objectors” of the importance of empirical work.  For Douglas (1934, xii) this was an 
antidote to the “sterile shadow boxing which has characterised so much of dialectical 
economics”.  This dispute was part of the ongoing warfare between Douglas and Knight 
(and his disciples) that characterized Chicago in the 1930s (Leeson forthcoming).   
  
ii Fisher (1933, 124) associated the idea that the supply of money should grow at 3% per 
year (in line with the growth of trade) with Snyder, Edie and James Harvey Rogers.   
 
iii
 Friedman was at the University of Minnesota in the year before his return to Chicago; 
as was Stigler from 1938-46, with a three-year break (Stigler 1988, 39-40; Friedman and 
Friedman 1998, 148-9).  Marget (1938), one of their Minnesota colleagues, published a 
two-volume ‘monetarist’ Theory of Prices: a Re-examination of the Central Problems of 
Monetary Theory.  In the AER review of ‘Monetary Theory at the Textbook Level’ 
Marget (1942, 781, 787) noted that it “can hardly escape even those who will not go 
beyond the titles of the chapters” that the authors of the textbooks under review had 
“unashamedly accepted … the ‘equation of exchange’ [emphasis in original] as an 
organising device” and were “unrepentant users of the Fisherine equations as their formal 
framework”.  The two books reviewed by Marget were Harold Reed’s (1942) Money, 
Currency and Banking and George Halm’s (1942) Monetary Theory: A Modern 
Treatment of the Essentials of Money and Banking.  Friedman used Reed’s (1942) text 
for his Economics 230 course at Chicago and a number of Reed’s judgments “align 
remarkably closely” with the some of Friedman’s macroeconomic judgments (Hammond 
1999, 462-3).  Referring to the word “money” Reed (1950, 210) explained that he 
“agree[d] with Mr Homer Jones that the word should be dropped from scientific 
terminology”.  Currie (1933, 79) suggested that “the continued use of the term ‘credit’ 
appears to be an obstacle both to the advancement of monetary science and its application 
                                                                                                                                                 
to current problems”.  One alternative was to “drop the word entirely on the grounds that 
its ambiguity renders it unsuitable for scientific purposes”.    
 
iv
 Angell’s father, James R. Angell, was President of Yale University, and was described 
by William O. Douglas (1974, 164) as “broad-gauged, tolerant and fastidious when it 
came to academic freedom”.  Angell and Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of 
Columbia, received unfavourable comment in President Roosevelt’s ([1937] 1950, 650) 
private correspondence for “howling their heads off” against the new income and 
inheritance taxes which they believed would dry up the flow of new contributions to the 
universities.  After the First World War, Angell Sr. as Acting President of Chicago, 
recruited the twenty-four year old Robert Hutchins (the future President of Chicago) as 
University Secretary (Reagan 1982, 221; Time 1967, 183).  James W. Angell was born in 
Chicago, graduated from Harvard, and spent 1919-20 as Viner’s teaching assistant at 
Chicago (Patinkin chapter 5 [1981], 267, 280, n).  Angell taught at Columbia from 1924, 
as Full Professor, 1931-66, and Emeritus Professor after 1966 (American Men of Science 
1968). He was vice president of the American Economic Association (1940) and was part 
of the US delegation to the Bretton Woods conference.     
 
v
  The JPE also published Currie’s (1933) ‘The Treatment of Credit in Contemporary 
Monetary Theory’. 
 
vi
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 44. 
 
vii
 In ‘The Spending Tax as a Wartime Fiscal Measure’ Friedman (1943, 51, n3) 
explained that his analysis offered “no judgment … on the critical issue separating the 
“Keynesians” and “anti Keynesians”.   
 
viii
 He obtained his doctorate on The Economic Results of Prohibition from Columbia 
(Warburton 1932). 
     
ix
 Milton Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Warburton file. 
  
x
 Milton Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Golembe file.  In conversation with 
Warburton, Leland Yeager (1981, 280, 284) reflected on his “puzzlement” over the 
relative lack of influence that Warburton achieved.  Academic “gamesmanship” was 
advanced as a potential explanatory factor.  
 
xi
 In the 1930s both Friedman’s wife and one of his mentors (Homer Jones) were 
employed in the Division of Research and Statistics within the FDIC (Friedman and 
Friedman 1998, 65).   
 
xii
 Milton Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Warburton file. 
 
xiii
 In contrast, Arthur Kemp (1979, 11), the Treasurer of the Mt Pelerin Society (1969-
79), characterised Currie as “a classic figure among the early members of the Chicago 
                                                                                                                                                 
School”.  Kemp does not explain where this information is derived from, but presumably 
he had recently been in close contact with Stigler, the 1976-8 President of the Mt Pelerin 
Society (Hartwell 1995, 78).  At a 1977 seminar at the University of Toronto, John 
Scadding, the seminar chairman and a Chicago graduate, asked Currie what was the price 
of money.  Currie replied “the price level”.  “Congratulations!” shot back the chairman, 
“you pass the test” (correspondence from Sandilands 15 March 2002).  
 
xiv
 Neisser was Professor of Monetary Theory, at the Wharton School of Finance and 
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
xv
 Friedman (chapter 7 [1974], 167) was “amazed” to discover how “precisely” Viner’s 
account of the Depression “foreshadows” the interpretation contained in his Monetary 
History (Friedman and Schwartz 1963). 
   
xvi
 Currie’s Supply and Control of Money in the United States (1934) was described in a 
Chicago Public Policy Pamphlet as “An extremely valuable analysis … carefully and 
logically presented” (Whittlesey 1935, 25).   
 
xvii
 Warburg (1969, 2944) described the bill as “Curried Keynes” a “large half-cooked 
lump of J. Maynard Keynes … liberally seasoned with a sauce prepared by Prof. 
Laughlin [sic] Currie” (see also Egbert 1967, 122).  
 
xviii
 Hegeland (1969 [1951], x, 96) spent two years in the United States researching his 
1951 history, but reported no mention of a Chicago quantity theory tradition.    
  
xix
 Friedman (chapter 2 [1956], 16) stated that  “The quantity theorist must sharply limit, 
and be prepared to specify explicitly, the variables that it is empirically important to 
include in this function … the quantity theorist not only regards the demand for money 
function as stable; he also regards it as playing a vital role in determining variables that 
he regards as of great importance for the analysis of the economy as a whole …The 
quantity theorist also holds that there are important factors affecting the supply of money 
that do not affect the demand for money”.  
 
xx
 The owner of the Chicago Daily News, Colonel Frank Knox, who had previously been 
general manager of Hearst’s newspapers, and was Alfred Landon’s Republican vice 
presidential running mate in 1936, declared that “the new deal candidate has been leading 
us towards Moscow”.  During this 1930s “red scare”, Charles Walgreen, a prominent 
drug store owner, withdrew his niece from the University of Chicago believing that she 
had been exposed to the doctrines of free love and communism.  Finally, Walgreen was 
persuaded to donate funds to establish the professorship at Chicago which Allen Wallis 
successfully offered to Stigler in 1958. 
 
xxi
 For a more balanced assessment, see Sandilands (2000) and Boughton and Sandilands 
(2002).  Also see Sandilands’ online biography of Currie on American National 
biography On-line at www.anb.org. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
xxii
 I am most grateful to Roger Sandilands for supplying me with this information. 
  
xxiii
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 44. 
  
xxiv
 Lauchlin Currie Papers, Correspondence, Lepawsky file. 
 
xxv
 “Jimmy Angell contributed ideas on prices and money” (Moley 1939, 15, 18, 22). 
 
xxvi
 In his review, Dennis Robertson’s (1937, 330) noted that Angell’s policy proposal 
was to keep “national income relatively stable … by stabilising the quantity of circulating 
money” [emphasis in original].   
 
xxvii
 In the Friedman Papers there is a “Reading List in International Trade Economics 
125-6 … (Revised: 1933)”.  A tick appears alongside a 1931 essay by Angell on ‘foreign 
exchange’ for the encyclopedia of the social sciences.  However, there is no record on 
Friedman’s Columbia academic transcript of him attending this two-semester course.  (At 
the bottom of his transcript three courses are listed as having been “visited”: social 
economics given by J.M. Clark, one in Labor given by Leo Wolman and one in theory 
given by R.W. Souter).  Milton Friedman Papers, Box 5. 
 
xxviii
 Patinkin (6 August 1972) replied: “On Angell, I won’t argue with you about his 
theoretical abilities, (though a letter I received from Viner would seem to indicate a 
somewhat higher estimation).  However, as I recall, Angell did emphasise one empirical 
finding (namely, that monetary changes followed those in prices, instead of preceding 
them) that I think should have been dealt with by the Chicago School”.  Don Patinkin 
Papers, Box 32.  In 1934, Angell and Currie engaged in dispute over their early separate 
estimates of the income velocity of money.  Their estimates of the course of money’s 
“income velocity” in the 1920s differed widely and made for very different 
interpretations of Fed policy at that time. The dispute essentially revolved around their 
different definitions of “money”, Currie preferring a narrower, means-of-payments 
definition (see Sandilands, 1990, 41). 
 
xxix
 In Friedman’s Papers (Box 5) archives is a 10 page “Reading List in Money and 
Banking Economics 127-8 (J.W. Angell) Revised: 1933”. Section three of the course on 
“The General Theory of Money, Banking and Prices” has 72 books or articles listed for 
reading.  Items marked “##” were described as “Required Reading, to be prepared for 
class-room discussion”.  Among such items were Fisher’s “The Purchasing Power of 
Money (1911)”, Keynes’ “Monetary Reform (1924), pp. 1-95” and “Treaties [sic] on 
Money (2 vols., 1930)” and Angell’s “Theory of International Prices (1926), pp. 116-135, 
178-186, 274-280, 308-312, 324-331”.  
 
xxx
 Alan D. Whitney (21 August 1976) recalled in a letter to Friedman that “Angell was a 
fascinating personality” (Milton Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Whitney file).  While 
some detected misanthropic tendencies in Angell’s personality, others, such as Kenen (a 
                                                                                                                                                 
young departmental chair dealing with older and more senior colleagues) recalled that 
Angell was most helpful.  Stigler (1988, 43) was Angell’s Columbia colleague for eleven 
post war years but the only “oral … legend” that he associated with Angell was his 
displeasure when Arthur F. Burns (then a PhD candidate) declined to answer a role-
playing question about how he (as Treasury Secretary) would respond to a financial 
panic.  Anna Schwartz sought to submit A Monetary History of the United States 
(Friedman and Schwartz 1963) as her Columbia PhD thesis.  Burns, the Director of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), may have contributed to the delay she 
experienced in having her dissertation approved by questioning whether her individual 
contribution to the Friedman-Schwartz NBER project was sufficient to warrant 
acceptance.  If Angell was a difficult thesis committee member, this may have increased 
Friedman’s contempt for Angell.  On 22nd October 1958, Friedman (with a copy to 
Angell) wrote to Albert Hart at Columbia about “a matter that is strictly speaking on my 
business, namely, Anna Schwartz’s thesis problem … the report of her conversations 
with you and Angell suggest to me that, she must have presented the case very badly 
indeed … it is incumbent on us to keep our requirements from being meaningless 
hurdles, and to adapt them to the particular situation … the fundamental problem is how 
to satisfy formal requirements without imposing ‘make-work’.  If I may again cite our 
own experience, we have had the same problem here in the past few years in connection 
to other mature scholars, Homer Jones and Herbert Stein”.  Six years later Friedman 
(January 7th 1964) wrote to Barger explaining that he had tried to contact him by phone to 
“talk over with you the problems connected with Mrs Schwartz finally getting her degree.  
She tells me that there has been some question raised over using A Monetary History 
because it is in printed form and this limits the possibility of people on the committee 
making suggestions for change … it would be a shame to let technicalities of any kind 
play an important role in the process … I would much prefer to talk to you about this than 
to write about it because clearly I am very much misinformed and there is some 
misunderstanding about it on her part”.  Barger immediately (16th January 1964) wrote a 
sympathetic letter to Schwartz explaining that he did not know “how much trouble [the 
committee] may cause you about revisions” (her thesis was finally approved later in the 
year).  Milton Friedman Papers, Correspondence, Schwartz file.   
   
xxxi
 Patinkin’s original essay (chapter 5 [1969/1981]) was published thirteen years after 
Friedman’s essay (chapter 2 [1956]). 
 
xxxii
 Sandilands suggested the JES as an outlet for Laidler’s reply; Laidler suggested that 
Tavlas be invited to respond. 
  
xxxiii
 Patinkin (January 24, 1994) wrote to Sandilands to say how pleased he was “for 
more reasons than one” to see Laidler’s (chapter 33 [1993]) essay in the JPE.  Don 
Patinkin Papers, Box 66.  
 
xxxiv
 Not only was Patinkin a gatekeeper with respect to the journals, he played a similar 
role with respect to application for funding from research foundations.  Patinkin did not 
support Steindl’s request for financial assistance to support his monetary research. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
xxxv
 Another book review casts further doubt about Simons’ supposed commitment to 
analysing the economy through the quantity theory.  Edwin Nourse (1933, ix-x) of the 
Brookings Institution in his Director’s preface to Leo Pasvolsky’s Current Monetary 
Issues explained that Pasvolsky’s objective was to present “a general survey of the 
monetary issues which have dominated world economic discussions during the past year.  
After showing the divergence of opinion between various groups and nations 
participating in international discussions and negotiations during the course of the year, it 
sets forth the trend of monetary developments in the United States”.  But Pasvolsky 
confined his attention to “the vital relationship of present monetary policies to economic 
recovery”.  Pasvolsky did not mention the quantity theory and neither did Simons in his 
February 1934 review.  Instead, Simons (1934, 53) stated that he was “impressed 
throughout with his fairness and competence in the analysis of issues and in the 
interpretation of conflicting positions”.     
 
xxxvi
 This was the position he had maintained in a letter to Steindl (7 August 1989).  Don 
Patinkin Papers, Box 62.  
 
xxxvii
  I was unable to find Stigler’s letter and so I am relying on Patinkin’s report of it (to 
Stigler 18 June 1991).  Don Patinkin Papers, Box 62. 
 
xxxviii
  Don Patinkin Papers, Box 62.  
 
xxxix
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 37. 
 
xl
 In the resulting essay, Patinkin (1981 [1973], 40, n19) tentatively attributed to Knight 
the second generation Chicago tradition that “there is no such thing as a free lunch”.  
Knight (1935 [1932], 251-276) wrote the entry on ‘Interest’ in the Encyclopaedia of the 
Social Sciences; Patinkin (1968) wrote the equivalent entry in the Encyclopaedia 
alongside Friedman’s Encyclopaedia entry on the quantity theory (chapter 4 [1968]) 
which was the “nominal” reason for Patinkin’s initial assault (chapter 5 [1969/1981]).   
 
xli
 In ‘Comment on the Chicago School’ Stigler (1962, 71) asserted that the title invited a 
“slovenly stereotype”.  
xlii
 For a detailed discussion of this controversy, see Leeson 2000, chapter 3. 
 
xliii
 Patinkin (1981, 8) also attended Oskar Lange’s 1944 Economics 307 lectures on 
Imperfect Competition and A.J. Nicholl’s course on Imperfect Competition.  In an article 
published while he was still at the University of Chicago, Patinkin (1981 [1947], 91, n) 
proposed to use empirical evidence to improve the theory of imperfect competition.  
Moreover, Patinkin acknowledged that “I cannot overemphasize my debt to Professor 
Henry C. Simons, on whose Economics 201 Syllabus … this article is so largely based”.  
Stigler (1974, 2-3) acknowledged that Patinkin had “elaborated” upon Simons’ analysis 
of cartels.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
xliv
 Wallis’ (1993, 776) recollections supported Stigler’s: the Chicago faculty of the 1930s 
gave Chamberlin’s work “no attention: literally none”.  However, Albert Hart’s (1936, iii, 
151) Chicago dissertation (supervised by Knight, Viner, Henry Schultz and Theodore 
Yntema) had been “very profoundly … influenced” by the “recent writings on ‘imperfect 
competition’ (especially those of Mrs Robinson, and Drs. Hicks, Chamberlin and 
Kaldor)”.  Hart also recalled that Simons’ and Aaron Director’s undergraduate teaching 
material had been “freely cribbed by George Stigler and others”.  Paul Douglas (1972, 
351, n) explained that he been “strongly influenced by Joan Robinson’s The Economics 
of Imperfect Competition … After nearly forty years I still think Mrs. Robinson’s book 
was the best in my generation”.  
 
xlv
 Patinkin took a very jaundiced view of a paper submitted to the JPE by one of his 
opponents in the dispute over the Chicago tradition.  Patinkin (11 June 1982) informed 
Stigler, that with respect to his role as a referee “it was a serious misallocation of my 
resources to have spent so much time on a paper that is superficial, unscholarly and 
carelessly written – and whose rejection I accordingly unhesitatingly recommend”.  The 
report sent to the author appeared to be quite neutral – but the JPE editors were left in no 
doubt about Patinkin’s determination to see the paper rejected:  “Despite the concluding 
sentence of my report, I have strong doubts whether [the author] has the necessary 
scholarly qualifications for carrying out the proper study … and so I do not think you 
should ask him to resubmit it after revision”.  Don Patinkin Papers, Box 51.  
   
xlvi
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 48.  According to one of his Chicago colleagues, verbal 
disputes with Stigler were “likely to be terminated by a positivist edict and a sneer” 
(McCloskey 1994, 14).   
 
xlvii
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 61. 
 
xlviii
 On other occasions Patinkin appeared to resort to ridicule when challenged.  Patinkin 
(chapter 19 [1986], 120) criticised Parkin for being “more Friedmanian than Friedman” 
because Friedman had “subsequently admitted” the Keynesian influence, but “there is barely 
a hint of this fact in Parkin’s paper”.  Parkin (correspondence to the author, 24 October 
1997) recalled that “Patinkin seemed angered and seemed to take my critique personally.  
He insulted me personally in his published response.  I thought about rejoining but 
decided not to after talking with Milton”.  Laidler (correspondence to the author, 4 
November 1997) recalled that “Patinkin was contemptuous of Parkin’s JMCB piece”.  
See also Patinkin’s (1978, 577) patronising “plea for common sense” to counteract the 
basic illogical fallacies (christened “Jacob’s Principle”) which he detected in David 
Roberts’ (1978) critique of his analysis of Keynes’ Monetary Thought (1976).   
   
xlix
 Don Patinkin Papers, Box 57. 
 
l
 In a review of the AEA Survey of Contemporary Economics, Stigler (1949, 101, 98, 
102) noted that the collection “demonstrates anew that interest in the history of thought 
has languished mightily”.  This had impoverished the “scope and depth” of the essays in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the volume and also “contemporary economics” in general.  This concerned Stigler 
because it was “easy to show that the neglect of doctrinal history has led the contributors 
to exaggerate the recent advances in theory”.  Also, a “second characteristic of recent 
economics documented by the Survey is the triumph of statistics over history as the 
source of empirical knowledge”.  This was lamentable because the “historical method … 
has the obvious advantage of making available a long sweep of experience unrecorded in 
statistics.  This alone is ample reason for exploiting it: we are [emphasis in original] 
interested in the long run.  The historical method has also the advantage … of yielding 
information on a much wider range of problems than one can illuminate with quantitative 
studies”.  As Chicago lost its “outcumbent” status, Stigler’s views about the role of 
historical studies appeared to have changed.  Stigler (1988, 214-5) concluded that “I 
cannot be confident that it would be profitable for a young scholar to study the history of 
his subject”.  Stigler (1969, 217-8, 230) defined “the subject matter of the history of 
economics to be economics which is not read to master present day economics”.  In other 
words, the history of thought was a largely redundant subject: “one need not read in the 
history of economics – that is, past economics – to master present economics”.  Stigler 
predicted that “the young economist will increasingly share the view of the more 
advanced formal sciences that the history of the discipline is best left to those 
underendowed for fully professional work at the modern level … it remains the 
unfulfilled task of the historians of economics to show that their subject is worth the 
cost”.   
 
li
 In 1972, Stigler successfully proposed that the history of economic thought requirement 
be dropped at the University of Chicago.  Most other economics departments later 
followed suit (Rosen 1993, 811).  Deirdre McCloskey (correspondence to the author 2 
June 1997) recalls that at the same meeting Stigler unsuccessfully proposed that the 
economic history requirement also be dropped.    
 
